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I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the scholarly attention concerning the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) has focused on the political, economic or
ethical aspects of this movement. This focus does not detract from
the importance of the NIEO since the NIEO, like most aspects of
international relations, must occur within a context using a set of
procedures affected by international law. International law, for var-
ious reasons, may be neutral or even hostile toward the NIEO. Most
of the principles of international law were formulated by a few de-
veloped countries; the developing countries, until very recently, par-
ticipated minimally in the development and implementation of inter-
national law. Thus, in many respects, international law is conservative
and conflicts with the aspirations expressed in the NIEO.I
There are many ways to observe the tenuous link between in-
ternational law and the NIEO. One point of departure is the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in December, 1974.2 Some attention will be
given to this Charter, but it is merely a UN Resolution and conse-
quently of little legal significance. The NIEO and the jurisprudence
of international law successfully interact in the area of the law of the
sea, for the law of the sea has developed contemporaneously with the
NIEO.
In the half century during which the law of the sea conferences
took place, the NIEO evolved from playing no role in 1930 to being
* B.A., 1967, College of Wooster, Ohio. M.A., 1969, University of Washington.
Ph.D., 1971, University of Washington. Assistant Professor of Marine Affairs and Political
Science, University of Rhode Island, 1971-1976. Professor of Political Science, Behrend
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1. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation
of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
2. The General Assembly adopted the Charter on December 12, 1974, by a vote of
120 in favor, 6 against, with 10 abstentions. For the text of the Charter, see 12 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRON. 108 (Jan. 1975).
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a major force behind the conference in 1973-1983. Many of the
successes and failures of the NIEO are mirrored in actions taken by
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III). Roughly speaking, the beginning of the "modem" era in the
law of the sea began in 1967 with Ambassador Pardo's (Malta) speech'
to the General Assembly calling for a treaty prohibiting militarization
of the seabed beyond national jurisdictions and permitting use of the
resources found there for mankind as a whole .4 The forces of the
NIEO were clearly at work here, and many of these same goals were
dealt with in the draft treaty produced by UNCLOS III. But it must
be acknowledged that the adverse reaction of some developed states,
most notably the United States, gives an indication of what may
become of the NIEO when concrete action is proposed.
The development of the law of the sea, especially over the last
two decades, provides insight into the NIEO and the degree to which
it may enter the mainstream of international law. Although UNCLOS
III is the first comprehensive forum on the law of the sea, it is of
particular importance because developing countries achieved a degree
of unity in supporting the NIEO. Thus, the lessons learned from the
experiences in the law of the sea may be helpful to the NIEO as it
develops in other areas.
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE NIEO AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Before examining UNCLOS III more closely, a very basic ques-
tion must be answered: How do the NIEO and international law
interact? Two examples, one dealing with the "common heritage"
of the ocean floor, and the other dealing with the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, will help illustrate the interaction.
Before UNCLOS III convened, a rallying cry heard in the UN
was the "Common Heritage of Mankind": "The sea-bed and the
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction [hereinafter referred to as the Area], as well as the re-
sources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind." 5
Since the idea of the common heritage of mankind became a
3. 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 92) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1965).
4. For a good discussion, see E. GOLD, MARITIME TRANSPORT 310-13 (1981).
5. Brown, The 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Consequences of Failure
to Agree, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE 1, 16 (L. Alexander ed.
1972).
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principal vehicle for the NIEO, it is instructive to see how various
states reacted to the early assertion of the common heritage doc-
trine. Belgium presented a typically Western view. It was patron-
izing but generally sympathetic to the idea of the common heri-
tage: "What's in a name? My delegation has always recognized that
the concept of a common heritage, without having any clear juridical
significance, nevertheless represents a whole moral and political com-
plex of great value." 6 Canada expressed a similar idea stating that
the common heritage doctrine was not yet a legal principle, but merely
a concept on which law might be built.7
It is to be expected that the most enthusiastic supporters of the
common heritage doctrine are the less developed countries (LDCs),
since they were the doctrine's principal architects. There were im-
portant differences in the degree to which LDC representatives at-
tempted to ascribe international legal bases to the doctrine. For ex-
ample, the representative from Barbados stated:
It is obvious that the international community is in the beginning
stages of a revolution in relation to the entire body of international
law covering the marine environment. Like all the best revolu-
tions, this one is about justice. Not even the most purblind pa-
ternalist in the rich industrial nations of the world would deny that
the law of the sea has evolved along lines which have very little
to do with the concept of international democracy. I am not point-
ing the finger of blame; I am merely stating facts. A number of
the so-called "doctrines" which exist today are little more than
reflections of old power balances which are totally irrelevant to
the realities of the seventh decade of the twentieth century.8
In interpreting the doctrine, the delegate from Chile acknowl-
edged that the common heritage doctrine was a "new and revolu-
tionary concept in international law and policy." 9 It is significant
that some of those who advocated the doctrine were uneasy about
ascribing legal bases to the concept. For example, the Chilean state-
ment is softened by the insertion of the word "policy." The most
extreme assertion of a legal foundation of the common heritage doc-
trine was made by the representative from Guyana, who said that
common heritage was a "preemptory norm of international law" that
6. Brown, supra note 5, at 16-17.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id.
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must be obeyed by all.' 0
Some of the most strident criticisms of the legal bases of the
common heritage principle came from Eastern European representa-
tives: The Byelorussian delegate commented:
Speaking of legal principles, we should like to stress that, as in
the past, the Byelorussian delegation cannot support the concept
that the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and the resources thereof are the common heritage of
mankind-in other words, a kind of collective property of all
countries. That concept does not take into account the objective
realities of the contemporary world, in which there are states
having different social systems and different property regimes."
Bulgaria echoed these sentiments but also injected an East/West
dimension: "[T]he concept of a common heritage could in practice
become a mere legal and institutional cover for powerful interests and
was likely in any case to lead to confusion."' 12
These statements illustrate the nature of the conflict between
international law and the NIEO. The West maintains that, while the
NIEO (as represented by the common heritage doctrine) may be right
and just, it has little to do with international law. The West views
the common heritage doctrine not as a legal principle, but as a set of
"agreed [upon] moral and political guidelines.""' This is in vivid
contrast to the view of LDCs. Speaking in 1968, Ambassador Pardo
explained that justifications for the NIEO:
could not be sought in traditional doctrines of international law;
they must be new, equitable and moral .... The concept that
any area was to be administered in common for common good
was somewhat alien to existing international law. Nevertheless,
its introduction as the basis of international law on the seabed and
ocean floor was essential, not only for the development of that
environment, but also for the peaceful development of the world. '4
Another example of the interaction between the NIEO and in-
ternational law (and one unrelated to the law of the sea) can be found
in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 17-18.
12. Yankov (Bulgaria), AD Hoc SEA-BED COMMnIrEE, A/A.C. 138/S.C. I/SR. 9, 24
Mar. 1969, at 96.
13. Brown, supra note 5, at 23.
14. A. PARDO, AD Hoc COMMITrEEON SEA-BED, A/A.C. 135/W.G. I/SR. 3, 3 Sept.
1968, at 52.
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the UN General Assembly on December 12, 1974, by a vote of 120
for, 6 against, with 10 abstentions. 5 The beginning of the Charter
reads: "Declaring that it is the fundamental purpose of this Charter
to promote the establishment of the new international economic order,
based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common in-
terest and cooperation among States, irrespective of their economic
and social systems.' 16
Although the avowed purpose of the Charter was to give an
advantage to LDCs, the vote suggests that it was acceptable to the
vast majority of states. 17 But there are certain aspects of the Charter,
notably article 2.2(c), which cause grave concern among international
legal scholars in the West. Article 2.2(c) provides:
To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign prop-
erty in which appropriate compensation should be paid by the
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws
and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers per-
tinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic laws of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means
be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in
accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 18
A recent article by Professor Weston explains some of the major
problems with the Charter. 19 For example, article 2 "omits mention
of the public purpose doctrine, i.e., the contention that foreign prop-
erty rights and interests cannot be 'taken' except for reasons of public
necessity or utility." 20 A strong argument can be made that article
2.2(c) really discriminates against foreign property, which would fly
in the face of international commercial law. Of all aspects of article
2, perhaps the most disturbing is the use of the word "should" with
regard to compensation for property seized. Overall, the. Charter
seems to run contrary to basic international law which in some cases
might otherwise work to the advantage of the LDCs.
A reasonable conclusion from these two illustrations is that
15. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 108 (Jan. 1975).
16. id.
17. Id. Preamble (b).
18. Id. at III (emphasis added).
19. Weston, supra note 1.
20. Id. at 439. See, e.g., B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 24-25 (1959).
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conflicts exist between the aspirations of the NIEO and traditional
international law. Some conflict is attributable to the continued desire
of the "haves" to perpetuate a scheme ensuring their domi-
nance. Another source of conflict is from those who support the
LDCs, but feel that law and politics are not interchangeable and that
stretching international law too far to encompass such causes will not
help the LDCs. A detailed look at UNCLOS III will help to bring
these issues into sharper focus.
III. THE CONVENTION TEXT ADOPTED BY UNCLOS III
On April 30, 1982, UNCLOS III adopted the text of a new
comprehensive law of the sea treaty by a vote of 130 to 4 (with 25
abstentions).2 The hurdles of signature and ratification remain, along
with U.S. resistance, but this document provides a good example of
the international forces advocating the NIEO.
The text is massive, with 320 articles and 9 annexes. Thus, this
article will only classify some of the treaty's textual material as it
bears on the NIEO. While it is acknowledged that substantial dis-
agreement may exist as to what falls under the rubric of the NIEO,
the intent here is only to provide an overview for the way a major
international conference approached these issues. A careful reading
of the treaty text suggests five categories into which material dealing
with the NIEO might be placed with the categories corresponding to
the means by which the NIEO might be advanced by the treaty:
1. General appeals based on the moral right of the cause,
but not mandating specific action;
2. Provisions that penalize the more technologically ad-
vanced states;
3. Provisions that give special preferences to developing
states;
4. Special privileges for certain subcategories of developing
states; and,
5. Provisions providing for the transfer of technology from
developed to developing countries.
A. Moral Appeals
The cynic may question whether moral appeals represent any
victory for the NIEO. They carry no sanctions and fail even to list
specific desired courses of action. A good example of the ideological
21. 19 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 6 (June 1982).
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tightrope that must be walked in dealing with the NIEO is in the
preamble to the Convention:
Bearing in mind that the achievement of such goals will contribute
to the realization of a just and equitable international economic
order which would take into account the interests and needs of
mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and
needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked.22
It is not surprising that the interests of humanity as a whole are to be
considered with special attention paid to LDCs. However, there is
some question whether this general expression provides for specific
action.
There are many general statements about the NIEO in that portion
of the Convention (Part XI) dealing with the area beyond national
jurisdiction. In parallel fashion to the wording of the preamble,
the "[a]ctivities in the Area shall ...be carried out ...for the
over-all development of all countries, especially developing
countries .... "123 Further, a review conference was proposed to
assess the first fifteen years of operation of the treaty regime, and to
determine whether the goals of the NIEO were being achieved: "The
Review Conference shall ensure the maintenance of the principle of
the common heritage of mankind, the international regime designed
to ensure equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for the
benefit of all countries, especially the developing States ... "24
B. Provisions that Penalize Technology
If one accepts the general view that the NIEO must be advanced,
an approach would be to penalize those countries with a technological
edge, thereby neutralizing some of the advantages they enjoy. Transit
passage through straits is one example of a "technology pen-
alty." The Convention provides that "foreign ships, including ma-
rine scientific research and hydrographic ships, may not carry out any
research or survey activities without the prior authorization of the
States bordering straits. ''25 Since it is largely the developed states
that traverse straits and many developing states border straits, this
can be viewed as an attempt to control the technology possessed by
22. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and Resolutions I-IV, II U.N. GAOR
Supp. 82-30296, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited
as U.N. Convention].
23. Id. art. 150.
24. Id. art. 155.
25. Id. art. 40.
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the wealthier countries, the exploitative potential of which is feared
by the LDCs. 26
The Convention reached an interesting set of compromises con-
cerning rights to the seafloor adjacent to a state but at a distance
beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast. Keeping in mind that the
developed states almost exclusively possess the technology to conduct
such operations, the Draft Convention states:
The payments and contributions shall be made annually with re-
spect to all production at a site after the first five years of pro-
duction at that site. For the sixth year, the rate of payment or
contribution shall be 1 percent of the value or volume of production
at the site. The rate shall increase by 1 percent for each subsequent
year until the twelfth year and shall remain at 7 percent thereafter.27
Both examples illustrate the attempt to extract some concessions
from those who have the technology to exploit the seabed. Such
provisions may inhibit the use of those technologies which, in the
case of the second example, would mean that no contribution would
be made. But both provisions are much less stringent than they might
have been.
C. Providing Economic Preference for LDCs
While there is a thin line between "taxing" technology and
providing a special economic advantage to developing states, the latter
approach is more common in the Draft Convention. One of the
clearest examples of giving an economic preference to the LDCs is
seen in the provisions triggered when a state cannot harvest all the
fish in its 200-mile exclusive economic zone. When a state does not
have this capacity, it shall "give other States access to the surplus
.. . having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70,
especially in relation to the developing States mentioned
therein.' '28 The intent of the drafters is made clearer, as one of the
specific criteria for granting access to excess catch is "the nutritional
needs of the population of the respective States." 29
It is not surprising that pollution control is one area in which
special economic advantages would be demanded by the LDCs. What
26. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventorn and Prospect, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 561, 587-88 (1983).
27. U.N. Convention, supra note 22, at art. 82.2.
28. Id. art. 62.2.
29. Id. art. 70.3(d).
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is surprising is the degree to which the Convention states the case
explicitly:
Preferential treatment for developing States. Developing States
shall, for the purposes of prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the marine environment or minimization of its effects
be granted preference by international organizations in:
(a) the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assist-
ance; and
(b) the utilization of their specialized services. 3o
D. Special Treatment for Certain Categories of LDCs
Since the economies of some developing countries are heavily
dependent on income from land extracted minerals, the economic
effects of sophisticated seabed mining could be disastrous to
them. Thus, this group of LDCs is singled out for special treatment:
Upon the recommendation of the Council on the basis of advice
from the Economic Planning Commission, the Assembly shall
establish a system of compensation or take other measures of
economic adjustment assistance including co-operation with spe-
cialized agencies and other international organizations to assist
developing countries which suffer serious adverse effects on their
export earnings or economies resulting from a reduction in the
price of an affected mineral or in the volume of exports of that
mineral, to the extent that such reduction is caused by activities
in the Area. 3
Similar concern was not expressed for the economies of devel-
oped countries. Such provisions are not limited to the Area. With
regard to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, developing
states may, under certain circumstances, be exempt from the'tax which
must be paid: "A developing State which is a net importer of a
mineral resource produced from its continental shelf is exempt from
making such payments or contributions in respect of that mineral
resource. "32 The fact that the diversity of LDCs was accommodated
shows a certain maturity among NIEO proponents.
E. Transfer of Technology
A hallmark of the NIEO is the feeling that LDCs do not want
charity. Instead, they prefer to be given the tools and the training in
30. Id. art. 203.
31. Id. art. 151.10.
32. Id. art. 82.3.
19831
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
order to modernize and develop themselves. This goal is reflected
in many provisions of the Convention that deal with technology transfer.
The Authority, the entity that will manage the deep seabed,
provides for a massive transfer of technology both to the developing
states and to the Enterprise, the organ of the Authority that will actually
engage in mining:
The Authority shall take measures in accordance with this
Convention:
(b) to promote and encourage the transfer to developing
States of such technology and scientific knowledge so
that all States Parties benefit therefrom.
To this end the Authority and States Parties shall co-operate in
promoting the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge
relating to activities in the Area so that the Enterprise and all States
Parties may benefit therefrom. In particular they shall initiate and
promote:
[Pirogrammes for the transfer of technology to the En-
terprise and to developing States with regard to activities
in the Area, including, inter alia, facilitating the access
of the Enterprise and of developing States to the relevant
technology, under fair and reasonable terms and
conditions;
[M]easures directed toward the advancement of the tech-
nology of the Enterprise and the domestic technology
of developing States, particularly by providing oppor-
tunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from de-
veloping States for training in marine science and tech-
nology and for their full participation in activities in the
Area.33
Similar provisions exist with respect to the preservation and
protection of the marine environment. 34 Perhaps a less likely place
to find technology transfer provisions is Part XIII of the Draft Con-
vention dealing with Marine Scientific Research. Certain provisions
in this section interfere with scientists' ability to conduct research:
For this purpose, States, both individually and in co-operation
with other States, and with competent international organizations,
shall actively promote the flow of scientific data and information
33. Id. art. 144.1, 144.2.
34. Id. art. 202.
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and the transfer of knowledge resulting from marine scientific
research, especially to developing States, as well as the strength-
ening of the autonomous marine scientific research capabilities of
developing States through, inter alia, programmes to provide ad-
equate education and training of their technical and scientific
personnel .31
It is not surprising that marine scientists do not object so much
to the spirit of such provisions but rather to the ways in which they
may be interpreted. Scientists are understandably sensitive about re-
search results being disseminated piecemeal, prematurely or taken out
of context, all of which are possible given the various interpretations
of these provisions.
An entire section of the Draft Convention is devoted to the
Development and Transfer of Marine Technology (Part XIV). The
introduction for this section declares:
States shall promote the development of the marine scientific and
technological capacity of States which may need and request tech-
nical assistance in this field, particularly developing States, in-
cluding land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States, with
regard to the exploration, exploitation, conservation and manage-
ment of marine resources, the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, marine scientific research and other activities
in the marine environment compatible with this convention, with
a view to accelerating the social and economic development of
the developing States. 36
There are various ways in which these general provisions might
be implemented. States are required to promote "the acquisition,
evaluation and dissemination of marine technological knowledge and
facilitate access to such information and data." 37 States are also re-
quired to "establish programmes of technical co-operation." 38 It is
open to question how thorough and genuine such measures would be,
as it may be possible to follow the letter of such articles and still do
nothing significant in the transfer of technology.
35. Id. art. 244.2.
36. Id. art. 266.2.
37. Id. art. 268(a).
38. Id. art. 269(a).
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IV. THE FATE OF THE UNCLOS III DOCUMENT AND THE
NIEO
While the impression may be that all the problems attendant with
drafting the treaty have been resolved and that signature, ratification
and entry into force will come easily, substantial obstacles still re-
main. Although the Conference voted to accept the treaty on April
30, 1982, it is uncertain how many states will sign and ultimately
ratify the document.3 9
The voting breakdown suggests a "have/have not" split on rat-
ification. Of the 21 states voting against or abstaining, very few are
developing states, even though this group is the overwhelming pre-
ponderance at the Conference. 40
The United States' objections were more significant than forecast
and appear to be irreconcilable, at least as long as there is no change
in the Administration in Washington, D.C. The UN reported the
reason for the U.S. vote in this way:
39. The Convention requires 60 ratifications (or accessions) to enter into force. Id.
art. 308. 1.
Voting on Acceptance of the Treaty: In Favor: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bhutdn, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, People's Democratic
Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein. Madagascar. Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia (Council
for), Nepdl, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman. Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania,
Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Samoa, San Marino, Sdo Tom6 e Principe, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon. United Republic of Tanzania, Upper
Volta, Uruguay, Viet-Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Against: Israel, Turkey, United States, and Venezuela.
Abstaining: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia. German Democratic
Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg. Mongolia, Netherlands,
Poland, Spain, Thailand, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and United Kingdom. (Not
Participating: Albania, Ecuador, Holy See, and Liberia.)
Absent: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Comoros, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia,
Kiribati, Maldives, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu. and Vanuatu.
40. 19 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 6, 13 (June 1982).
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James L. Malone (United States), explaining his negative vote,
noted that three months ago. President Reagan had reaffirmed United
States commitment to the multilateral treaty process for reaching
agreement on the world's oceans. Within the context of an over-
all acceptable treaty, he had also noted that the many provisions
of the Draft Convention concerning navigation, overflight, the
continental shelf, marine research and the environment and other
areas were basically constructive and in the interest of the inter-
national community.
President Reagan had also said, Mr. Malone noted, that the
United States had serious problems with elements of the deep sea-
bed mining provisions and would seek changes to meet six broad
objectives that would make the treaty acceptable to the United
States. Those include the failure to provide assured access to sea-
bed minerals, lack of proportionate voice in decision-making for
countries most affected, the provision for amending the conven-
tion, the creation of precedents that were "not appropriate," and
the barrier which the Convention would set up in the development
of sea-bed resources by play of basic economic forces in the market
place. 41
A sizeable group of states abstained from voting, including most
of the European Economic Community and Eastern European
States. Some of the statements made by representatives of the ab-
staining states bear on the NIEO issues. A representative of the
Belgian delegation said that she was concerned about "equitable rep-
resentation for countries such as Belgium in the organs of the projected
International Sea-Bed Authority" as well as "realistic provisions for
the transfer of technology.' '42 Ambassador Bos of the Netherlands
expressed a similar sentiment, stating that " [w]ithout the participation
of the major countries, the elaborate sea-bed system would not func-
tion as envisioned."
43
It is clear that the NIEO is an important part of the difficulty
now faced by the Convention. After the conference ended, additional
information surfaced concerning the position of the United
States. Representative John Breaux, a leading Congressional oppo-
nent of the treaty, stated: "We have seen no willingness on the part
of developing country delegates to seriously negotiate U.S. propos-
als. In fact, other than a half-baked proposal for so called grandfather
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 17.
43. Id. at 18.
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protections, this negotiating session produced no new text." 44
Professor H. Gary Knight of Louisiana State University stated
that the text did nothing but "inhibit the creation of value" by people
"who have neither the energy nor will to get something for them-
selves." According to Knight, the LDCs are asserting a "right to
steal." ' 45 It must be emphasized that Knight's is a minority position
supported neither by most governments nor the UN. In fact, Bernado
Zuleta, UN Under Secretary General, broke from his typical diplo-
matic posture and said that the United States was the "principal
antagonist" to the treaty and that it was unfair for the U.S. to claim
advantages from certain parts of the treaty while rejecting other parts. 46
Since the conference approved the treaty, more light has been
shed on the U.S. position. In September, 1982, the U.S., the
United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany signed
an Interim Agreement on Deep Sea-Bed Mining.4 7 Regardless of the
real intent of the four parties, this action created the impression that
leading developed states are preparing to proceed with exploitation
of the deep seabed independent of the treaty. Furthermore, the de-
cision of President Reagan on July 9, 1982, that the U.S. "will sign
the final act of the Conference as an indication that we have partic-
ipated" but without signing the treaty dashed all hopes that the U.S.,
at least in the immediate future, will participate in the treaty. 48
There are indications that it was not just the NIEO provision
which caused the U.S. and other countries not to support the treaty. It
is true that the so-called "Green Book," prepared by the U.S. De-
partment of State in advance of the last session of the Conference,
points out many changes desired by the U.S., some of which bear
directly on the NIEO issues. 49 It should be remembered that the U.S.,
notwithstanding Representative Breaux's objections, was successful
in obtaining certain changes. In addition, many of the United States'
objections had nothing to do with the NIEO. An overall assessment
is difficult; the issues pertaining to the NIEO were an important
component of the U.S. decision, but they were not the only is-
sues. Remembering that this was the most complex international
44. 24 OCEAN Sci. NEWS I (No. 18, 1982).
45. Id. at 2.
46. 24 OCEAN Sci. NEWS 2 (No. 35, 1982).
47. Id.
48. 24 OCEAN Sci. NEWS I (No. 27, 1982).
49. 24 OCEAN Sci. NEWS 2 (No. 11, 1982).
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negotiation ever attempted, the task was arduous even without the
complicating factor of the high aspirations of the Third World.
V. CONCLUSION
The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea is significant
for a number of reasons. Not only is it the most significant treaty-
writing exercise in history, but it is the first major multilateral con-
ference to take place since the NIEO became a salient issue in inter-
national law and politics. The substance of the NIEO is strong and
those states favoring the NIEO perspective have the power needed to
bring those issues to the fore.
Perhaps it would have been easier if the NIEO had come of age
in a less demanding international legal forum. For example, one can
imagine the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties as
an example where the NIEO might have been able to succeed in
making certain changes in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. On the other hand, it may be argued that the Vienna Con-
vention did not significantly advance the goals of the NIEO. This
is not true with UNCLOS III where one finds dozens of important
economic issues and the control of trillions of dollars of resources at
stake.
It is possible to draw some conclusions about how one might
expect the aspirations and goals of the NIEO to manifest themselves
in conventional international law. The general assertion of the moral
right of the NIEO's cause, along the lines of that expressed in many
UN General Assembly resolutions, will be prevalent in future con-
ventional international law, gradually swaying international public
opinion and eventually changing international law. Conversely, it is
possible that these general assertions might be substituted by sub-
stantive actions. It is probable that provisions which penalize those
states with advanced technology will become the rare exception as
states use more positive techniques, such as those found in the Draft
Convention, which provide preferential treatment for LDCs.
The fact that specific provisions in the text acknowledge that
special treatment may be needed for some LDCs is significant. This
was highlighted in UNCLOS III by the fact that certain developing
states are land-based producers of the minerals that will be mined
from the deep seabed. Thus, states that are both developing and land-
based producers deserve special protection. Perhaps those portions
of the treaty which deal with transfer of technology portend the
19831
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incorporation of the NIEO into conventional international law. It is
clear that many LDCs prefer this approach. Some developed states
have been supportive of such provisions both on general moral grounds
and in exchange for resources and rights. But there are potential
difficulties in implementing many of these provisions. Often, only
the barest outline of a course of action is provided. Developed coun-
tries that wish to emasculate the technology transfer articles can do
so.
It is important to note that the United States' decision not to sign
the treaty was only partly based on objections to the NIEO. Some
of the changes proposed by the U.S. are based on such objections,
but, to cite one example, the proposed changes suggest no changes
to the section dealing with the transfer of marine technology. The
safe assumption is that NIEO issues contributed to the U.S. position
in what was already a very complex negotiation.
Regardless of the righteousness of its cause, the NIEO is still an
adolescent in terms of international law. In the law of the sea, the
NIEO encountered the most difficulty with the issues surrounding the
deep seabed, but substantial gains were made in areas in which far
greater economic and technological payoffs were possible, e.g., sci-
entific research, fisheries, and the continental shelf beyond 200
miles. However, in its youthful enthusiasm, the NIEO may have
sacrificed important long-term gains for short-term expediency.
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